Permanent News (poetry)

Permanent News

(click above for poems)

A great poet described poetry as news that stays news. I hope these 8 poems on political violence in post-democratic Bangladesh - especially the murder of young politicians by themselves - remain permanent memorials.

Last year, around 38 student politicians killed each other. They have been hailed as the champions of democracy when, in fact, they are mere foot-soldiers of the political parties involved in criminal activity. This is the reality of Bangladeshi democracy that's never revealed.

democracy, religion and violence

Holy places: Unholy rows | The Economist: "For all the rhetoric of ancient hatred, religious rows have grown worse in modern times. Across the Ottoman empire, from the Balkans to Anatolia to Palestine, Christians and Muslims mingled peaceably at shared sacred places.

- Sent using Google Toolbar"


In Bangladesh, Muslims and Hindus lived peaceably until the election of 2001. The Hindus tend to vote for the Awami League, as Muslims in India tend to vote for the Congress Party. In 2001, the League lost, and a coalition of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and an Islamist Party won.

Immediately, an anti-Hindu pogrom swept the land: there was arson, looting, raping...the nation was stunned.

Clearly, religion had nothing to do with it: it was politicians stirring up hatred, and, of course, greed for the spoils of victory, which seems to include women.

Interestingly, the parties went on to persecute a heretical Muslim sect, the Aḥmadīyahs, with almost equal ferocity. Again, secular observers blamed it on religion.

Not so.

Consider the following extract from the Britanica:

"In their theology, the Ismāʿīlīs have absorbed the most extreme elements and heterodox ideas. The universe is viewed as a cyclic process, and the unfolding of each cycle is marked by the advent of seven “speakers”—messengers of God with Scriptures—each of whom is succeeded by seven “silents”—messengers without revealed scriptures; the last speaker (the Prophet Muḥammad) is followed by seven imāms who interpret the Will of God to man and are, in a sense, higher than the Prophet because they draw their knowledge directly from God and not from the Angel of Revelation. During the 10th century, certain Ismāʿīlī intellectuals formed a secret society called the Brethren of Purity, which issued a philosophical encyclopaedia, The Epistles of the Brethren of Purity, aiming at the liquidation of positive religions in favour of a universalist spirituality.

The late Aga Khan III (1887–1957) had taken several measures to bring his followers closer to the main body of the Muslims. The Ismāʿīlīs, however, still have not mosques but jamāʿat khānahs (“gathering houses”), and their mode of worship bears little resemblance to that of the Muslims generally."

You can't get more heretical than this! Yet the Aga Khanis - as the Ismailis are known in Bangladesh - are some of the richest people here. Their location is highly conspicuous (many live in flats near Bailey Road, Dhaka across from one of the best schools in Dhaka) and their mode of worship is strikingly different. They have a jamaat khanah, where they gather every evening, and regular Muslims are not allowed in there. Naturally, weird stories proliferate about the goings-on in the jamaat khanah. When I set up a poultry farm, some of my best customers were Aga Khanis: they are extremely rich, as I said.

Their influence is international.

When General Ershad arrested Aziz Mohammed Bhai, probably the richest Aga Khani in Bangladesh, Prince Aga Khan himself came down to secure his release.

All this influence and wealth explain why the pogrom never extended to these people: it wasn't a religious pogrom at all.

The fuse was democracy, and the politicians vented their anger on the weakest members of society: as happens in India during anti-Muslim pogroms.

The spread of democracy throughout the world will bring disaster for religious minorities: in Egypt, Christians are already worried - as they well should be.

Democracy and Violence

I remember the electoral fight between my uncle, Major General (retd.) M. Khalilur Rahman and the president's man in their constituency of Jamalpur.

The general was winning, when suddenly the counting was stopped on state television. When it was resumed, we found that the general was losing. General Ershad, the president, had rigged the polls.

And what a wonderful thing that was: it meant that my uncle, no matter what he did, could not win. That meant that even if he had employed thugs he would still have lost. So, naturally, neither side employed thugs. This was the benign aspect of 'democracy' under dictatorship: the absence of goons.

When Ershad fell from power, of course, thugs and murderers and rapists became the norm. Without these criminals, you couldn't win an election.

This is what 'free and fair' have meant for Bangladesh: rule by criminals.

A Question Of Inheritance

New Age | Newspaper: "A skirmish between Islamic Law Implementation Committee activists and law-enforcers left one man killed and at least 30 people injured in Jessore on Sunday.

The clash erupted when the police intercepted a procession brought out by the Islamic bigots to drum up support for today’s countrywide general strike called by the ILIC in protest against the Women Development Policy 2011 that they claim to contain anti-Islamic provisions ensuring a spectrum of women’s rights.

The deceased was identified as Hafiz Hossain Ahmed, a student at Madaninagar Hafezia Madrassah and son of Ismail Ahmed of Chakla under Monirampur upazila of Jessore.

- Sent using Google Toolbar"

Notice the language of the New Age: the protesting mullahs are 'bigots' and 'zealots'. Is this reportage? Naturally, such language diminishes the death of the young student, who was nothing but a 'bigot' and a 'zealot'.

I sympathise with Anjuman-e-Hefajat-e-Islam (Society for the Protection of Islam), though I deplore their method: instead of a hartal, they could have resorted to peaceful protest.

These people are struggling against 'desacralisation', though they would not use the term. Islamic law has, since the encounter with the west, been whittled down to Muslim Family Law: the clerics are struggling against even this remnant being whittled away. For the government, NGOs and western donors want to repeal the Muslim law of inheritance and give equal inheritance rights to women. The mullahs have nothing against women: women are the safest in the Muslim world, thanks to Islam.

In a brilliant letter to the editor in the now-defunct Bangladesh Observer (no other newspaper would have printed it, certainly not the New Age or the Daily Star), a writer argued thus: "...whenever questions of inheritance comes it seems that a hundred per cent of the people take for granted that each and every parent leaves behind a (sic) huge property and their heirs are just to distribute them and enjoy. In fact, this is a misconception. Many a father leaves behind huge debts. Who pays back the debts? Usually in our society not a single girl is asked to pay the debt of her father (Md. Shah Jahan, Letter, 4 April 2008). "

When a father passes away, and his janaza is held at the mosque, it is the son who tells the congregation that if his father had any debts, the debtor should come to him. Daughters never do this. Culture, religion and law are perfectly aligned here.

The above writer foresees "doomsday" for women if they are also expected equally to inherit assets as well as liabilities. It is only the propertied elite that leave behind property.

"It is the microscopic wealthy section of society, which may claim for equal right of inheritance for boys and girls but the majority of girls will not prefer to pay debts of their parents. They are far greater in number and their voice is not heard." True.

Equality is a western obsession born of the experience of freedom, a preoccupation unknown in the rest of humanity.

More generally, people who hate Islamic law are quite happy to live and work in the UAE, for instance, protected by the sharia and the monarchy. My uncle lived in Abu Dhabi for years, made a packet and moved to Canada, from where he looks down on 'autocracy'. It seems that people like to go where the money is: mullahs can offer very little cash unlike NGOs and western donors.

I hope for the best for the Anjuman-e-Hefajat-e-Islam.

S&R Fiction – “Sahel” by Iftekhar Sayeed | Scholars and Rogues

S&R Fiction – “Sahel” by Iftekhar Sayeed | Scholars and Rogues


(click above for story)

This story is set in Kuakata, in the south of Bangladesh, where two men and a woman arrive from the Middle East by sea in a boat on a moon-lit night to join Zafar Shah for a deadly venture.

Excerpt:

"The sun sank under the cirrocumulus clouds that draped the sky in sheets of muslin while low, cumulus clouds appeared blue-back. I pushed off to a discreet distance so I could only hear the surf and the wind, and not their conversation, although it was carried on mostly in Arabic, with a few English words and the name of the petroleum company distinctly audible. I wanted to know as little as possible about the three locals in case I was tortured. I wish it had been dark when I saw their faces.

The moon had risen hours ago, but only now came into its own. Sirius twinkled, and soon Orion appeared in majesty. The wind grew cooler by degrees. The sputter of an engine-boat reached me as it floated down the Andarmanick, then grew quieter, decibel by decibel. The tide had turned, and it would come further up than before, being spring tide."

CONFESSIONS OF A STUDENT POLITICIAN OF BANGLADESH

CONFESSIONS
OF
A STUDENT POLITICIAN
OF
BANGLADESH

An Interview

by

IFTEKHAR SAYEED


[The People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the Democratic People's Party (DPP) are both fictionalized names of real parties. This manoeuver has been undertaken to protect the identity of the student politician, who is now undergoing his umpteenth rehab.]

“1987. Age 13. Class 8. I was mildly involved. From 1988 I joined the PDP, when I was in class 9.
“Family. I didn’t used to get along with my father. Normal with my mother. Normal with my brother. My brother knew about it a little; my studies were not being hampered by politics.

“Since I was in class 6, I had been observing the activities of the DPP with distaste. I used to avoid the party....

“1988. Age 14. Disgusted with the DPP, I myself created a group against them at school. This group used to print anonymous leaflets against the DPP. We used to prevent other boys from joining the processions organised by the DPP.

“1988. I knew a student worker of the PDP personally; he lived in my neighborhood. He organised a committee for me at my school. After the committee was formed, we printed posters and leaflets using the name of the PDP. Apart from the movement at school, I would take my boys to participate in movements conducted by the PDP outside school. Nobody at home knew because I would stay home at night, and was active only during the day. My grades started getting worse. I missed classes. Teachers would harass students belonging to the PDP, not because the students would not study, but because the teachers belonged to the DPP.

“1989. Age 15. The first ‘action’ at school. The boys of the DPP always came to school organised, in a group. We took an action against this. We decided we wouldn’t let the other boys enter school that day. Some boys used to stay at the school hostel. During the afternoon tiffin period, I left my pipe-gun and cocktail with my boys who stayed at the hostel and some of us left. We missed class that day. The other boys got wind of this, and they told their teachers that there were arms at school. If they didn’t get rid of them, they would inform the police. The teachers then started to question us. Then my boys put the arms in a sack and dumped them. So the teachers didn’t find anything. Then my boys showed the DPP’s papers to the teachers.

“The next day, the school was full of the DPP boys. On that day, I arrived at school at 9:30, long before classes started. We used to hold our meetings on the roof of the nearby market building. On the way there, the boys surrounded me. I ran. I reached the roof. We decided that some of us would have to attend class, no matter what it would take. After two of us entered class, the teacher started accusing us of wrongdoing. Then the teacher beat me and the other boy, and tore our hair.

“How I got hold of arms. The aim was to organise a program at school, save money and buy arms. The teachers tried to stop us, but we went ahead with the program. We also collected tolls [=extortion money] from businessmen in the area. Then we bought arms from an ironsmith. Pipe-gun, 250 takas ($4.5); cocktail, 1100 takas.

“After this episode, the PDP started giving us total assistance. They started to send boys from the armed cadres, or cells. They were our age; they didn’t attend school. Their sources of income were gambling, black marketing in cinema tickets, mugging, selling drugs, and extorting money from hawkers and shop-owners. These were ‘taxes’. Taxes were collected on a fairly regular weekly basis. The cadre boys would receive tax proportionate to the area they could control.

“1990. The aim was to disrupt the meeting of a prominent leader of the DPP. The DPP also had their armed cadres guarding the place. I now joined the student wing of the PDP. We led a procession towards the meeting. But the police stopped us. From then on the mid-level leaders of the student wing gave me a pipe-gun.

“1990. Age 16. I got into college in August. November. The anti-Ershad movement began [General Ershad was dictator at the time]. Everyday, we threw bombs at police cars, barricaded the roads and violated curfews to lead processions, then run.

“Nobody at home, except my brother, knew about my participation in these activities.

“Ershad broke up his own student body and harassed the other student bodies. He had broken up his student body, but he employed his own parties’ students as goons. These goons would beat us up in front of the police and walk around openly with arms. Besides, during election Ershad used to steal votes. All these things made me and my friends react to them. I reacted by joining the oust-Ershad movement.

“Ershad fell. The election came. There were two candidates for the party nomination, Ahmed and Azam [names disguised]. I was on Ahmed’s side. But he didn’t get the nomination. Then Ahmed got another candidate, Afzal [name disguised], from [a third] Party to run against Azam, so that Azam couldn’t win. My friends and I began to work for Afzal. The party members knew about all this, but nobody would talk about it openly. During the election, we used to break up the offices of the DPP.

“27 February. Election day. We went from door to door and picked up people in rickshaws and got them to vote. The rickshaw-fare was paid for by the party. We got people from slums to give false votes. We cast false votes ourselves. The election ended.

“1991. 1st year college. Age 17. The two factions formed during the election started to bicker. There were 50 boys in my group. The other side had around 10 or 12 boys. We threw them out of college. Then they started attacking us at sudden intervals. They used to beat us up when we went out. We used to get together before coming to college and stuck together even inside the college. We couldn’t go out of the college alone.

“We hadn’t yet had our Fresher’s Welcome. Using the welcome as an excuse, we collected money from the students. Later, we collected money from students when they sought admission to college, around Tk.1200-Tk.2000 per head. We bought arms with the money, mostly bullets and powder. That was what we did the whole of 1991.

“April. I learned from one of the boys that the other faction had taken over the college. This information turned out to be wrong, as I discovered after coming to college. I beat up the boy who had misinformed me. He became furious.

“July. Three months later, one night some boys from the other faction came to my house and called me out. I wondered to myself, 'Let’s see what they are going do to me.' A shopkeeper in my area had warned me earlier not to leave the house. They broke the lights and darkened the street. Fourteen boys slapped and hit me and beat me up with the blunt end of hockey sticks – they hit me everywhere, on my head, chest, arms, legs, body.... Sensing an opening, I sneaked out. I ran to the party’s central secretary at the college. I couldn’t stand on my feet; the secretary took me to a doctor. One of my boys got wind of what had happened, and they seized the area. I went home at midnight. The groups were agitated, and senior members came and got us to make up. But the resentment lingered in the area for fifteen to twenty days. We had made up only on the surface; inside we were angry.

“Family. Before this incident, I didn’t use to talk much with my family. I used to come home at night just to eat and sleep. There were no words spoken between me and my father. On that night, when I came home, I had to knock a long time before my father opened the door. He wouldn’t let me in. He said, “You go wherever you like, I have nothing to do with you”. When he saw what shape I was in, he softened a little, and let me in.

“In 1991, I had no feeling for anyone at home. I just lived there. Even if my father hadn’t allowed me in that night, I would have stayed somewhere else. I didn’t care. There was only one thought on my mind: how was I going to get even with those boys? My mother was crying, and nursing me. My brother was lost. I had to stay home for fifteen days in order to recover. Then my father’s affection for me increased. But I felt nothing for anyone. After fifteen days, my father sent me to another town to my grandfather’s place. I stayed there two months. I lost touch with the party. I used to stay home, rest, read books and go out now and then.

“Two months later. October. Things had cooled down. I returned. I wasn’t interested in the party like before. I kept thinking about only one thing: how to get more arms and recruit an armed cadre of boys.

“December. Two of the boys who had beaten me up were hanging around in my area. Four of us beat them up good and proper: we used hockey sticks, knives, and cola bottles. The doctor gave one of them 48 hours to live. They both survived.

“I couldn’t stay home after this. Most of the time, I would stay out. I would return at midnight, and leave at dawn. One night, on my way home, I was shot at, but they missed. I ran. Things went on like this.

“One day there was a shootout between us and them. We made up and things cooled off, more or less.

“January, 1992. One day, the DPP boys picked me up from the back of the college and beat me up in a college room and locked me in. My friend’s brother was a leader of the DPP. He got me freed.

“February, 1992. I formed my own gang of boys at college, mostly boys of my own class. I would recruit boys who were reckless and wild. They had a kill-or-be-killed mentality. I used to get into trouble with the party over these boys. I used to get into trouble over other things, like power, admission of boys to college, money, arms....

“March. The intermediate exams drew near. I had to study. I lost the power I had. I appeared for the intermediate exam in commerce, got a second division.

“August. After the exam, I got back to the party. I’d lost my earlier power. I started afresh to acquire power. I became insubordinate; I would refuse to listen to commands from the top. I would send boys from my own group, or simply say no.

“One day, in a procession led by the DPP, three boys belonging to that party were shot and killed. I wan sent there by command from the party bosses. I didn’t want to go there, but I had to. I knew there would be violence, even murder. However, I went in the morning and came back in the evening. The murders happened at night.

“I wanted to give up the party, but I couldn’t, I was too involved. I needed protection. My frustration mounted. I started taking drugs. I used to take drugs before the exam, but for fun. Now, it became a regular thing. After taking drugs at night, I would resolve not to take anymore. But even if I somehow managed to stay home all day in great agony, I couldn’t stay at night. This is how things went on.

“I went back to my grandfather’s place. I took the drugs with me.

“I used to feel very helpless at the time. I wanted my father’s help. But he didn’t understand that. He would only give me orders. I grew more desperate, more angry with my father.

“October. I went to my uncle’s house in another town. I felt terrible that night, but I was under control. I stopped taking drugs for three months at a stretch. I wanted to join the army, but that didn’t work out. From January I started taking drugs again right until June. My grandparents caught on. They told my parents; I stopped again.

“After June. I still take drugs. I feel very frustrated. Now I regret everything. What have I done with my life? And for what? I could have done better in my exams. The whole family – cousins, aunts, uncles – have become aloof; they avoid me. They think I am a goon. And this causes enormous frustration. I start taking drugs whenever I get frustrated. I am studying for my bachelor’s exam in commerce, but my heart’s not in it. I study just because I have to. I have no interest in commerce, but I don’t know what I want. I can’t sleep at night; I have nightmares. Most of the time, I see people fighting. I don’t want to rejoin the party. Now I realise what the party has done to my life. Now I want other boys not to get involved in politics, but I can’t quite put it into words.”

The Meaning Lies in How You Use the Word

“We are scared to the point where we are no longer free.”

This observation was made by Max Price, vice-chancellor of the University of Cape Town, to The Economist ('The Great Scourges', A Special Report on South Africa, '5th June 2010) after the murder of yet another member of the staff last March.

The murder rate in South Africa is 33 per 100,000, compared to 5.1 in the United States. The rape rate is the highest in the world. 50 murders, 100 rapes, 330 armed robberies and 550 violent assaults are recorded every day. And the violence is often mindless.

Yet - and this is even more mindless - Freedom House gives South Africa a ranking of 2 in its 'freedom of the world index'(7 being completely unfree).

If you are not free not to be raped or murdered, then what kind of freedom is that? Clearly Freedom House's definition of freedom is very different from what most of us mean by that word.

Bangladesh: Stalker kills victim's father

Bangladesh: Stalker kills victim's father: "- Sent using Google Toolbar"




This kind of youth violence has occurred in the past couple of months because the ruling party patronises student and young thugs.

This is how politics is conducted in Bangladesh. When ruling party thugs can get away with any crime, it encourages the others.

This explains why such events are so new - they never used to happen before.

To Whom Can I Speak Today? (short story)

To Whom Can I Speak Today?

(click above for the story)

The democratic transition brings murder to the streets and even homes of Bangladesh. Several NGO directors mysteriously die trying to scrawl a message in blood. Zafar Shah takes it upon himself to decipher the vermilion calligraphy.



Excerpt:

'“Let me start from the beginning, Zafar sahib. When General Harun-ur-Rashid was in power, I was an MBA student. I was – and am - an avid fan of both the General and you, Zafar sahib. I have read all your newspaper articles and several of your books. You predicted that with the overthrow of the General, and the introduction of multi-party democracy, there would be violence, and a strong demand for security. As soon as I passed, I borrowed from banks and invested my own money in my security agency. The General was overthrown and my firm prospered.”'

The Flames of Freedom (short story)

The Flames of Freedom

(click on title for short story)

Opening paragraph:

"I shall always feel affection and respect for the man who wanted to destroy western civilisation. I remember clearly how we met – that was an adventure in itself. We met through Faria, and I met her at Hotel Poshur at Mongla."


This is a story of how western foreign policy affects the lives of distant people: it begins by the Poshur River at Mongla and ends at Teknaf. The themes are an insatiable longing for peace and the inevitability of violence.

civil society and violence

According to Chris Hedges' analysis, civil society - the churches and synagogues - have been directly complicit in the violence of war. That is not surprising: civil society has a long and dishonourable record as an instigator of violence from the Inquisition to the slave trade.

On the other hand, Islamic civilisation has hardly any civil society: western donors are busy trying to create one. Heaven forbid!

Take jihad. According to the Britannica, jihad is a recent phenomenon (I mean, of course, after the initial 100-year expansion of the Muslim world); when the west began to colonise the Muslims world, only dervishes, according to Bernard Lewis, showed some resistance.

Jihad was revived (after a brief spell in Africa) by the Americans when confronted with expansionist communism in Afghanistan. Since then, the same holy war - with almost the same personnel - has been turned against the west. And how many people have the jihadis killed? A couple of thousand.

It is interesting that the article does not mention the number of children murdered through sanctions in Iraq between the two Gulf wars: 1.7 million. During the height of the sanctions, a lower figure (still seven-digit), was cited by Norman Finkelstein in his book "The Holocaust Industry". When the figure stood at 500,000, he observes, Madeleine Albright went on prime time TV to say that it 'was worth it'.

Is it surprising that jihadis should try to hurt the west? Is 911 really a conundrum?

The Background to a Killing

What was the background against which Sheikh Mujib and his family were killed? The younger generation do not know and those who know do not care to enlighten them. Here are a few excerpts from Lawrence Zirring's classic "Bangladesh" (Dhaka: UPL, 1994). Please share this blog with as many as you can.


"Mujib believed he was Bangladesh, more so that he was good for the country and that it could not manage without him. Those who reinforced Mujib's impression of himself and his role did so because it benefited them politically or materially, not because they truly believed in his leadership." (p. 93)

"Mujib's bitter struggle with the army high command is illustrated by the decision to construct the Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini or National Security Force.…The Rakhi Bahini had quickly developed a reputation for intimidation and wanton aggression against the Bengali nation. Opinion was strong that that the para-military organization was no different from Hitler's Brown Shirts or the Gestapo. To informed observers as well as to a large segment of the population, Mujib and the Rakhi Bahini, not the Bangladesh army, posed the more significant threat to the country. The Bangladesh army, therefore, began to think of itself as the nation's salvation, the 'true' friend of Bengal." (pp 97 – 98)

"Unrestrained by law or law enforcement, defiant of the formal military establishment, gangs of toughs, many identified with the Rakhi Bahini even if they were without any official affiliation, roamed the countryside, looting the poor villagers and committing bodily harm on those resisting their demands. In the name of protecting society, the Rakhi Bahini, Bangabandhu's own, was viewed employing methods no different from the other anarchic groups." (p 98)

"In point of fact, Mujib exerted little if any control as the Rakshi Bahini assumed a life of its own and took upon itself the responsibility of eliminating Mujib's adversaries." (p 98)

"By 1974, several thousand local politicians had paid with their lives for their defiance or support of Mujibur Rahman. [Footnote: The environment of violence contributed to the events that ultimately took Mujib's life.] (p 99)."

"The momentum of violence had shifted from non-governmental to quasi-governmental contingents. Mujib, therefore, could not avoid the responsibility for the climate of fear and terror that gripped the country. Many of those allegedly killed by the Rakhi Bahini were rural leaders who had defeated Awami League candidates in the local polls that followed the parliamentary election (p 99)."

"Famine, always a threat, spread through the countryside in the summer of 1974, and no one, in or outside the government, seemed capable or willing to effectively grapple with the situation. Mujib was forced to acknowledge the starvation deaths of almost 30,000 people, and that was known to be a very low estimate (p 99)." [According to the Britannica, the figure was around 50,000, and there was food in the country, but the food was exported to India: see 'famine', Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th edition.]

"Thus, rather than starve in their remote villages, tens of thousands of peasants trekked to the towns and cities in search of relief….The task of keeping the famine-stricken outside the city limits was given to the Rakhi Bahini which showed little sympathy for their plight. The popular reaction to this callous display, this apparent breaking of a sacred promise, was predictable. Mujib was held accountable and he finally could not talk himself out of a hopeless situation. Empty words and gestures were exposed and the 'Friend of Bengal' witnessed the fading of his beleaguered popularity (p 100)."

"By the end of 1974, four thousand Awami Leaguers were reported murdered, including five members of parliament. There was reason to believe that many of the Awami League deaths had been cased by the Rakhi Bahini, which sensing a declining government apparatus and the loss of Mujib's prestige, sought to advance as well as protect itself….Mujib's fear had reached panic levels and he understood that this crisis would not pass. In a fateful move, he tried to back away from his reliance on the Rakhi Bahini, publicly attacked their violent excesses, and called upon the regular army to contain and control the smugglers and criminal elements in and outside the government (p 100)."

"Mujib found himself entangled in a web of his own making. His first order exposed the Bangladesh army to the magnitude of the national problem. His second order proved to be more fateful. On 28 December 1974, Mujib proclaimed a 'State of Emergency' in the country. These acts implied a form of martial law imposed by civilians rather than the military. Mujib had swept aside the constitution. Eventually the parliament was itself dissolved and the Awami League was transformed into a non-entity. Mujib had already laid plans for his new functional organization that he said better reflected his goals and hopes for the nation. BAKSAL was the inevitable outcome of these manoeuvres, but it was to be short-lived. Mujib sealed his own fate when he abandoned the three-year-old constitution and publicly condemned it as a legacy of colonial rule….But Mujib's coup did not have army support (p 101)."

"In January 1975, Mujib had himself sworn in as the country's president….Mujib, not the Bangladesh army, had removed the constraints on the arbitrary uses of power (p 102)."

"Having reached a moment when the only instruments of government lay in the utilization of violence, the question that emerged centred on where the violence would be directed. Mujib must have believed he could punish his enemies, i.e., anyone who challenged his supremacy. Indeed, Bhutto shared that thought two years later. But Mujib, as Bhutto was to learn, had the violence visited upon himself (p 102)."

"Mujib presided over a court corrupted by power. It acted as though it could shelter itself from the realities of Bangladesh. But the license that might have been ignored in some other societies, could not be ignored in a country overrun by self-styled enforcers, gouged by profiteers, and raped by government officials. With literally hundreds and thousands dying from hunger, with millions more threatened, high living in Bangladesh could only be equated with debauchery and hedonism, with irresponsibility and indifference. To anyone with a grudge or a sense of national purpose, the conclusion was the same. Deliberate efforts had to be made to reverse course, and the only option for such a reversal lay with a new team, and the only team capable of making the manouevre was the Bangladesh army (p 103)."

"BAKSAL was not only a coercive assembly, it was predicated on the elimination of other organizations. BAKSAL was Mujib's way of expressing his One-Party State. Thus in a more significant way, BAKSAL was meant to serve the purpose of the Bangabandhu's personal dictatorship, not the cause of national development and unity. BAKSAL was proof positive that Mujib intended to convert the country into a personal fiefdom for himself and his family members, and his many detractors did not need convincing that their once respected leader, not they, was the real threat to the nation's 'democratic' future (p 105)."

The army and the prime minister of Bangladesh

For background, visit: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/7911524.stm


[For those who know Bengali, it is strongly recommended that you visit this site:

http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=58213462185&topic=6839]




Even 10-year-old girls were raped, murdered and interred. The BDR jawans stripped the officers' wives and kicked them in the back and legs, and forced them to walk in this condition. The officers were pierced with bayonets into mincemeat.


When, on the night of the 26th, Mrs. Moeen, the army chief's wife, came to Mirpur Cantonment to see the female victims, she got an icy reception. Usually, the docile and respectful wives of the officers would rise, greet her and go towards her – not on this occasion. She left the premises silently.

What was it that prevented General Moeen U. Ahmed from sending tanks to their rescue post haste?

After the incident, the American ambassador has again and again lauded him for supporting the recently democratically elected government of Sheikh Hasina. Why?

Were these, then, his alternatives, his choices: (a) either to back the civilian government of Sheikh Hasina and abandon the officers to their fate or (b) to bypass the civilian government (that is, take over state power) and help his officers?

It is becoming more and more evident that the the events of 25th and 26th February at Pilkhana has the ruling party's signature all over it. As well as the army's – that is, a part of it.

Over the last sixteen years of two-party politics, every institution has been politicized: the bureaucracy was the first to go to the dogs, then the judiairy and the army. The most egregious example of the latter was when Sheikh Hasina took General Mustafiz out – yes, out – of retirement (he was on LPR – leave preparatory to retirement) and made him army chief again for his loyalty to the dynasty (he was, in fact, related to Hasina, and the whole family are rabid supporters of the League). Apparently, the General was only 'slightly retired', as in 'slightly dead' or 'slightly pregnant'. The other leader – Khaleda Zia of the BNP – did exactly the same in office.


So, when democracy was restored after a two-year military interregnum spearheaded by General Moeen and backed by the western donor governments, the army was more or less evenly divided between those loyal to Hasina and those loyal to Khaleda.

Now, Hasina has a greater following: she is regarded as a continuation of her father, Sheikh Mujib, the demagogue who inadvertently created Bangladesh. Her followers regard her incarceration under military rule as an unpardonable act of lese-majeste. They were baying for blood.

And, it seems, they got it.

But the unholy alliance between the army and the two politicians has been forged under the watchful eyes of the western donors. They saw it happening: true, they tried to get rid of the two 'begums' in a minus-two formula, but such was the tenacious loyalty of the followers (especially of Hasina), that it proved impossible.

Instead of drawing the ineluctable conclusion, as the late Samuel Huntington would have done, that democracy here is a no-go, the west insisted on elections.

In the process, they have ruined every institution that stands between civilisation and barbarism.

*************************************************************************************





[the material below is unedited, and is a first draft...more later]



[On 25th February, 2009, a section of paramilitary forces apparently mutinied against their army officers and killed over 150 of them, raping girls and women, and killing many of them as well]



The prime minister of Bangladesh was supposed to attend a dinner party at the Bangladesh Rifles Headquarters on the fateful day of the 26th of February, 2009. She declined to attend, and instead supervised the march past the previous afternoon. Apparently, she was warned on the 22nd not to accept the offer of dinner at the BDR HQ, but nobody at the BDR HQ knew for sure whether she was coming or not. She was sent the invitation card on the 23nd after 3:00 pm...and then her staff decided that instead of the PM, the Home Minster would attend. But the BDR HQ was nit informed.

Naturally, the PM totally refuses to acknowledge this as true – but the officers insist that this was true.

One officer maintained that the Home Minister left the officers in the hand of the rebels and walked out with only 25 weapons! How could she have done that?

In fact, if the army had been sent to succour them, those who were wounded but still alive would not have died, many women would not have been violated....

The PM's excuse is that the HQ is very big....and it was dark. The Home Minister rescued the families that she could.


Half an hour before the shooting began, General Shakil spoke with Sheikh Hasina, saying that, probably a section, the 54th battalion, of the BDR personnel had rebelled. Shakil was assured by the Prime Minister that the army was on its way.

They were told that forces were on their way from the 46th brigade ... if she had sent in forces then, the officers would not have died.

The rebels entered the Durbar Hall, where the officers were assembled, half an hour after the assurance was given that forces were en route. They started killing after 10:45 / 11:00 am. Everybody was told "They're coming! They're coming!" But nobody came.

At first only 20 to 25 soldiers were circling the Durbar Hall with rifles...They had no live ammunition, but were firing blanks. Ten to fifteen minutes later they broke into the armory and, before of the officers, started shooting inside. They still did not dare to enter the building, even though the officers were unarmed. .

Who put it into her (the PM's) head, that this had to be solved politically?

If the army chief had sent just one talk, or one platoon of commandos, they would have run like ants! [In fact, this is precisely what they did when the tanks turned up on Stamasjid Road, a couple of hundred yards from the scene – but the tanks arrived after 32 hours!]

The rebels had only one desire – to kill army officers. And this hatred for the army had been engendered by the politicians.

Parliamentary sessions broadcast on TV show that the ruling party MPs keep preaching hatred against the army. [Is a fact that both Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina had been kept in a makeshift jail for two years by the army. Every person loyal to the Awami League – like everyone in my family, for instance – hates the army for this reason. Yet the army was merely carrying out the instructions of western powers!]


After General Shakil spoke with the prime minister, the army chief, the director general of the Rapid Action Battalion...they waited, in vain.

There were 2,200 soldiers who were involved in the tattoo show and they comprised the initial group of rebels [remember that on the 26th, the BDR officers were still expecting the PM to come: hence the arrangements for the tattoo]. And who encouraged them? Outside the New Market gate, civilians were shouting through megaphones "Don't worry! The people are with us!" Who were these civilians?


Shakil told the officer the troops were on their way: but they never came.

A few jawans fired blanks – they weren't even armed. It was half an hour later that they broke into the armory and, in front of the officers in the Durbar Hall, armed themselves.

The officers were forced to march in single file, and the moment General Shakil stepped outside the door, four people came from outside and shot the General four times in the chest.

They not only killed the officers, they pierced them with bayonets - after killing them. If the PM had sent in troops, they wouldn't have dared to do this. They had no leadership till 1:00 pm...and then they started becoming organized.

There were around 7,500 to 9,000 soldiers – plus their families – in the BDR HQ – and they all escaped overnight. How?

The strength of a battalion is 840; there were 4 battalions; that makes it roughly 3200 soldiers; there were over 1,200 in HQ; 2,225 soldiers came with various attachments; signal personnel....altogether 9,000 to 10,000 soldiers were posted there – and their families of the same number. Now, the question is: how did so many people creep ant-like out of the HQ...who allowed this to happen?

MP Golam Reza was able to take out 10 army officers and certain families. He warned one of them not to say anything against the BDR because then many officers and their families were still inside the BDR.


If you ask a second lieutenant which Generals will lose their jobs when the Awami League loses power and the BNP form a government....the army has been thoroughly politicized over the last 18 years of political rule.

A certain colonel had not been given promotion by the senior officers, for whatever reason, after Sheikh Hasina became PM he became deputy commander of her regiment! He had not received his comeuppance because he 'smelt' of the Awami League under BNP rule!

Why should a general be promoted on the instructions of the PM?

If it was found that the son of the paternal sister of the maternal uncle was a BNP man, then the officer so (unfortunately) related would not get a promotion!



The PM insists that the army had been immediately deployed. One soldier died and another even received a bullet wound to his head. "If it'll take a long time to send the army, then tell the air force to send a helicopter so they'll be scared and won't do anything further."

The PM maintains that she had worked with the army, and if it hadn't been made a civilian affair then many more people might have been killed. [This claim sits oddly with the fact that the mere sight of the tanks sent the rebels – indeed the entire force inside HQ – running for cover.]

"As for the soldiers escaping, gate number 5 was totally open." Why was it open? And how did thousands leave through that aperture? "

"As for the civilian processions, I asked the police why they were allowing people to come near the gate?" [It would e incredible if ordinary people were coming near the gate; they – all of us – were terrified out of our wits, and the place was devoid of people.] "There are videos of the processions; why don't you, officers, have a look at the videos and see who was involved?"

On the question of intelligence failure, the PM was heard asking somebody "How many kinds of intelligence branches do we have? What kind of branches?" [She had no idea!]



At Senakunja, officers nearly begged her to issue an immediate order to hunt down the rebels.


"The defence forces have certain rules. We have given them 24 hours to surrender; and we have to wait. We have to give them this time. Search will begin right after 24 hours" This was the prime minister's reply.

Meaning: give them 24 hours to escape?

a diabolic editor - how newspapers back criminal governments in Bangladesh

"we praise the sagacity of the present leadership...."

http://thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=77589


I'm curious; but tell me, Mahfuz Anam, just how many dead bodies would it take for you to CEASE to praise the sagacity of the present political leadership? 200? 500? 1,000?

And how many would it take for you to begin to QUESTION the sagacity of the present political leadership? 10,000?

And how many would it take for you to IMPUGN the sagacity of the present political leadership? 100,000?



"It would have been a most satisfactory ending but for the fact that" - there were just too many dead bodies around, right?

What kind of an editor are you: can you distinguish between sagacity and stupidity? Honesty from mendacity? A mission accomplished from a bungled and botched operation?



"some unseen quarters with an ill motive..."

http://thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=77743

Well, they got all the help they needed from our government, didn't they?

They got away scot-free, with the lights turned off, after getting more than enough time to go on an orgy of killing, looting, burning, and more - from inside the city, under the gaze of the entire nation, with the military only a few blocks away!

With friends like these....


"Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina showed tremendous sagacity, farsightedness and patience in handling the crisis."

http://thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=77746

Does that include waiting 32 hours before deploying tanks, Mahfuz Anam?


"PRIME Minister Sheikh Hasina's stern call hs had the desired effect, and has led to the surrender of the rebel BDR troops. This brought to a peaceful end in Dhaka to what can be termed as the most serious...."

http://thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=77589


That giant sucking sound was that of the lips of the Daily Star editor coming off the backside of the prime minister.

It wasn't the prime minister's speech that ended the mutiny: it was the tanks.

It took 32 hours for tanks to be deployed: incredible!

The entire affair could have been ended in at most 10 minutes if the army had been allowed by the prime minister to act in its professional capacity. The army's arsenal was several thousand times that of the BDR personnel with their peashooters.

But for the amnesty and the shocking delay, the wives of the officers would have been spared the indignity they suffered. For once, Khaleda Zia has spoken the truth and put the blame where it belongs: why were the lights turned off, why were the soldiers withdrawn...?

This was not a civilian issue, but an issue for the military: yet civilians went in waving white flags and claiming to be 'like the mothers of the jawans'. There was absolutely no sense of urgency, as though a picnic had gone wrong

The Untold Story of Bangladesh - How Journalists Failed A Nation

For years, I tried to bring to the attention of the international mainstream media how student politicians in Bangladesh were raping girls and killing each other – and failed.


I recall writing to New Hope International, and the editor sending me a terse note saying that if I found democracy so deficient, what alternative did I propose? Earlier, the chief editor had said that they would have been happier if I had attributed the violence I described to the market-friendly policies of the World Bank and the IMF!

I approached the Christian Science Monitor – they weren't remotely interested. I wrote to The Nation – thinking that this paper would surely be concerned about the plight of teenage boys used as thugs by the political parties; I never even heard from them.

I sent an article to the New Statesman. I got a reply saying that the relevant editor would get back to me after the Christmas holidays. I never heard from him again.

Then, my own analysis told me what was going on – these major newspapers were part of what I have come to call "The Freedom Industry". Since their readers have been indoctrinated into believing that democracy is God's gift to mankind (George Bush's phrase), any criticism of democracy would not go down well with them. Prestige and money were at stake.

Finally, I learned about the Alternative Media/ indymedia.

My first break came when Csaba Polony of Left Curve published a cycle of poems on the murder of student politicians by student politicians. I was grateful: I realised that criticism of students – who were supposed to have overthrown a dictator in 1990 – would only be acceptable to low-budget, low-circulation. non-mainstream newspapers and magazines.

And that turned out to be the case: I sent my article to an online journal called Axis of Logic. The editor was breathless with excitement: he immediately published it, and even tried to call me from America – but it's not easy to get through to Bangladesh!

You can access the article here:

http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_23393.shtml

It's called THE FREEDOM INDUSTRY AND STUDENT POLITICS IN BANGLADESH: every year, on the average, 50 student politicians were being murdered after the democratic transition of 1990. Why? Because these kids were being used by the political parties to bring down the incumbent in street battles and campus violence. Those street battles are called 'hartals' (these are not 'general strikes'!). Here's a description of a hartal: " Salahuddin (33), a fisherman, was killed in a skirmish between the two student wings of the political parties in the latest hartal. Two rickshawpullers – one of them unidentified, the other Badaruddin (32) - were bombed while they were pulling their rickshaws during hartal hours. It took them 24 to 48 hours to die. An auto-rickshaw was burned to ashes, and when the driver, Saidul Islam Shahid (35), tried to put out the flames, he was sprinkled with petrol, and burned to death. It took him more than two days to die. Truck driver, Fayez Ahmed (50), died when a bomb was thrown on his truck. And Ripon Sikder, a sixteen-year-old injured by a bomb, died on 4th May at the Dhaka Medical College Hospital after struggling for his life for eleven days." The whole idea of a hartal is to keep traffic off the roads to paralyse the country and discredit the ruling party – and that's where you need the boys.

The boys were allowed – even encouraged – to rape with abandon. According to the Minister of Women and Children's Affairs, the number of rapes skyrocketed from 407 in 1990 to 2224 by 1997.

In September 1998, a committee investigated allegations of sexual abuse at Jahangirnagar University against boys from the Chatra League, the student front of the then ruling Awami League. It revealed that

“more than 20 female students were raped and over 300 others were sexually harassed on the campus by the "armed cadres of a particular political party. "

No one was charged.

In desperation people resorted to lynching: lynching was unknown in Bangladesh. If people caught a thief, they used to give him a good beating and hand him over to the police. Now, they started killing them. And then came the public torching of muggers and robbers – they were cremated alive in broad daylight by a populace that had had enough.

Then, I realised that reading newspapers – ranging from The Economist to the Guardian to the New Statesman – would not give me a true picture of the world.

Only anthropologists could do that.

The first eye-opener was Stanely J. Tambiah of Harvard University. In his book, Ethnonatioalist Conflict and Collective Violence in South Asia (a book that, to my knowledge, no mainstream paper ever reviewed), he blames the rise in violence throughout South Asia on the party political system.

He says: ‘...participatory democracy, competitive elections, mass militancy, and crowd violence are not disconnected. (Stanley J. Tambiah ,Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia, (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 1996), p. 260)."

I noticed that none of the NGOs ever raised their voices against student politics. Odd: these were supposed to be "civil society". Then two anthropologists revealed the truth.

The writers speak of an "aid market" that local NGOs know how to exploit.

“The political significance of such a massive proliferation of NGOs in Africa deserves closer attention. Our research suggests that this expansion is less the outcome of the increasing political weight of civil society than the consequence of the very pragmatic realisation that resources are now largely channeled through NGOs.”

The authors also - like myself - attribute the spread of democracy since 1990 to foreign donor pressure, and reject outright the notion of an emerging civil society: “It cannot simply be a coincidence that, now that the West ties aid to democratisation under the guise of multi-party elections, multi-party elections are taking place in Africa.” (Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (Oxford: James Currey, 1999)23, 22, 118).

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, donors insisted on multi-party elections. The Economist finally acknowledged the truth after fourteen years: “...the cold war’s end prompted western donors to stop propping up anti-communist dictators and to start insisting on democratic reforms” (December 18th 2004, p. 69).

Then, when democracy threatened to turn Bangladesh into another failed Muslim state, western governments intervened: they again allowed the army to take over on January 11th 2007.

The number of student politicians murdered plunged from 48 in 2006 to 10 in 2007 and 6 so far this year. The restoration of (colonial) democracy in December means that more kids are going to be killed every year, and more women raped by these kids.

But no newspaper will ever tell you that.


(For more articles on Bangladesh and violence, you can visit my website.

al-Ghazali on Democracy

[This essay was written before the military takeover of January 11, 2007]

There are some writers who would identify democracy with Christianity. One of them is Larry Siedentop. In his book Democracy in Europe, he observes: “For the Christian God survives in the assumption that we have access to the nature of things as individuals. That assumption is, in turn, the final justification for a democratic society, for a society organised to respect the equal underlying moral status of all its members, by guaranteeing each ‘equal liberty’. That assumption reveals how the notion of ‘Christian liberty’ came to underpin a radically new ‘democratic’ model of human association.” (The italics are the author’s.)
His words are not to be taken cum grano salis. In respect of the family, he makes a trenchant observation. The family, in Christian teaching, takes a back seat to the individual. “And he said unto them all, If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me” (Luke 9: 23) Here is Christ asking for free, voluntary sacrifice on the part of his disciples. So did the Prophet Mohammed; but the difference lies in the fact that Christ asked his follower to ‘deny himself’ – renounce family life, earthly good – in a voluntary association. According to Siedentop, this supremacy of the individual over the family was the herald of the civil society and western democracy. This supremacy is absent in Islam. “And he sent them to preach the kingdom of God, and to heal the sick. And he said unto them, take nothing for your journey....” (Luke 9: 2-3) Siedentop concludes: “...Christian and liberal norms have always had difficulty with assessing the claims of the human family, often treating it primarily as a preparation of adult freedom – a view which can perhaps be traced back as far as Jesus’s radical pronouncement on the need to reject family ties when the service of God, in conscience, requires it”.
This explains many anomalies in the practice of democracy in Bangladesh. Its chief proponents – ambitious men and women with careers rooted in the west - hold despotic sway over their children’s lives and careers. The nepotism that is rife within so-called ‘civil society’ in Bangladesh appears inevitable. In their desire to maximise their gains from the west, our democrats and NGO people try to have the best of both worlds – the Christian and the Muslim. They preach against nepotism, and practice it openly with donor money. They preach against despotism, and practice it openly in their institutions and organisations. For we admire the man who takes care of his family – it is an Islamic injunction – and we despise the person who neglects his family. We are awe-struck when we see Catholic priests give up home and hearth to come to this God-forsaken country from the United States or Europe to ‘serve the people’. If any one of us did the same thing, we would ostracize him – or bung him in an asylum!
Thus, Muslim society cannot be an association of individuals; there has to be a father figure at the top. There can be no democracy in Muslim society. In 1990, we rebelled against despotism: this was un-Islamic, a sin. This is not my view: it is the view of al-Ghazzali.
Al-Ghazali and al-Mawardi are only two examples of Muslim political philosophers who defended absolute despotism absolutely. “Sixty years of tyranny are better than an hour of civil strife,” maintained al-Ghazzali. Even today, Arab children are taught since childhood to fear chaos. Al-Ghazzali said that it was a religious duty never to overthrow a ruler "no matter how mad or bad". So long as he could maintain the peace and protect against external enemies, he must be tolerated – nay, it is our religious duty to preserve and respect his rule.
To quote al-Mawardi: ‘An evil-doing and barbarous sultan, so long as he is supported by military force, so that he can only with difficulty be deposed and that the attempt to depose him would create unendurable civil strife, must of necessity be left in possession and obedience must be rendered to him, exactly as obedience is required to be rendered to those who are placed in command”. The individual has a positive duty never to resist the sovereign.
I have deliberately emphasised the reference to military force – for this reference is not accidental. From the Prophet onwards, every khalifah and sultan and emir in Muslim civilisation was a military ruler. Initially, of course there had been no standing army - the citizen body itself was the army - just as there was no bureaucracy. Later both army and bureaucracy developed together. Whoever had military power had civil power as well, and never the other way around. (This extends to the navy also; Muawiyah was the author of the Muslim navy - the English word "admiral" comes from the Arabic "amir al-bahr", Commander of the Sea).
Our civilisation is, therefore, based on military rule and obedience.
Then Europeans came along and told us that it was barbaric for the military ruler to be the civilian authority – the former must serve under the latter. Since the Europeans conquered us and offered us rich rewards, we accepted their views and renounced 1,400 years of our civilisation.
If democracy and Christianity are identical (and they share many aspects, as Siedentop has demonstrated), what we are witnessing today is nothing short of mass conversion of our society. Even in Pakistan, the mawlanas – yes, even the mawlanas – insist that General Musharraf must relinquish his military post if he is to remain president: what arrant rubbish! Surely, one would expect learned mawlanas to recall the words of al-Ghazzali! But no! They, too, have sensed power, and election as the avenue to power, and are singing western songs. Throughout Muslim history, after the period of the Khalifa-i-rashidun, religious authority had been subservient to the secular powers, as al-Mawardi makes plain.
I can vividly imagine what al-Ghazzali would have said today had he been here: “Unhappy people! Fifteen years ago you rose in rebellion and sinned; today, you and your children suffer for that act of impiety; rape and murder are your everyday lot; some among you, inspired by alien ideas, think that merely because you can criticise your rulers, your are blessed. Criticise rulers! Heaven forbid! Would you criticise your father and mother? It is your religious duty not to criticise your ruler – of whom there must be only one, not many. You have learnt to despise military rule, and yet I lived and wrote under military rule. Your ancestors have prospered under military rule: and you think your ancestors barbaric! Where will you hide your shame? You who spit on yourself! The calamities that befall you daily can only be reversed if you reverse your rebellion of fifteen years ago. May Allah show you the true way, and may He protect you!”

Justice B. B. Roy Chowdhury on the events of December 6, 1990, and more....

The late Justice Bimolendu Bikash Roy Choudhury was one of the finest and most upright gentlemen it has been my pleasure to know. His respect for the constitution was such that he was furious with the events of December 6, 1990 – years after they were over – for he realised the long-term consequences of the fateful day.

December 6, 1990. President General H.M.Ershad resigns and hands over to the Chief Justice. Chief Justice Shahabuddin, rather than the then vice-president (as was demanded by the constitution), becomes acting president. The former vice-president belonged to General Ershad’s party, and, to have him excluded, the constitution was gleefully raped by lawyers, intellectuals, donors – and the Chief Justice. After elections, the chief guardian of the constitution had the constitution amended – by the 11th and 12th amendments [*] – by Parliament to legalise this act of illegality! And we had been taught to believe that the doctoring of constitutions was the prerogative only of military dictators!
The chief guardian of the constitution had become its chief violator, and, henceforward, none in this nation can ever believe that, in the face of sufficient international and domestic pressure, the highest court of the land, the only independent institution of the country, will never cave in.

Justice Chowdhury had great respect for General Ershad. He told me that the General had never tried to influence the judiciary. This was in stark contrast to the – democratically elected – Awami League, whose ministers took tot he street with sticks when the learned judges declared themselves too embarrassed to hear the appeal against the killers of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. A lower court had found the men guilty and has decreed that they be executed by "firing squad" – which is not allowed in Bangladesh, as the judge well knew – and, if that were not possible, by hanging. One can imagine the pressure that had been brought to bear on the magistrate, or his enthusiasm for the ruling party and its leader and prime minister at the time, Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Sheikh Mujib. One can imagine to what depths of barbarity we had descended when we reflect that our ministers carried sticks – against the judges!

Another interesting fact that Justice Chowdhury imparted to me (a fact that is never mentioned in our papers) was that General Ershad had tried again and again to separate the judiciary and the executive – and had repeatedly been frustrated by the bureaucrats. Our newspapers like to paint General Ershad as a "brutal dictator" – the facts speak otherwise. What kind of a "brutal dictator" tries to separate the executive (which he heads) from the judiciary. It was tantamount to trying to cut off his own legs!

And then in 1996 – after the Awami League shut down the country for several months and the ruling BNP tried to cling to power in a farcical election – some genius had the diabolic foresight to bring the Supreme Court into the democratic process by instituting a system of caretaker government before every poll – the chief caretaker being the last retired judge of the Court!

The Court, as was to be expected, became highly politicised – just like the bureaucracy and the army had been – and finally the western donors had to ask the army to take over on January 11, 2007: we had politicised every institution and faced near-civil war.

[*]
The appointment of, and the administration of oath to the Chief Justice of Bangladesh as Vice-President on the 21st day of Agrahayan, 1397 B.S. [local calendar] corresponding to the 6th day of December, 1990, and the resignation tendered to him by the then President and all powers exercised, all laws and Ordinances made and all orders made, acts and things done, and actions taken, or purported to have been made, done or taken by the said Vice-President acting as President during the period between the 21st day of Agrahayan, 1397 B.S. corresponding to the 6th day of December 1990, and the date of commencement of the Constitution (Eleventh Amendment) Act, 1991 (Act No. XXIV of 1991) (both days inclusive) or till the new President elected under article 48(1) of the Constitution has entered upon his office (whichever is later), are hereby ratified and confirmed and declared to have been validly made, administered, tendered, exercised, done and taken according to law. (The Constitution of The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Section 21, Fourth Schedule [Article 150])

ELECTIONS AND MURDER: The Case of Nixon and Kissinger

'[Nixon AND Kissinger were] willing to see lives sacrificed for domestic political advantage. In late 1970 Mr. Kissinger believed that America could get out of Vietnam any time it wanted and that it would do so before the 1972 election. The president wanted to plan the removal of all American troops by the end of 1971. Mr. Kissinger counselled against that idea because, if America's South Vietnamese allies were then destabilised, it might hurt Nixon's re-election campaign. He recommended a pullout in the autumn of 1972, "so that if any bad results follow they will be too late to affect the election". Nothing was said about how many Americans, or Vietnamese, would die in Vietnam. '

Book review of "Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power" (author: Robert Dallek), The Economist, May 19th 2007, page 83

The Perry Legacy

The Perry Legacy

(link above)

Over a hundred and fifty years ago, Commodore Perry turned a peaceful nation into a terrible force: there are lessons to be learned from the transformation of Japan. There are certain aspects of the west that should not be emulated.


Excerpt:

About Japan's change of government in the mid-90s, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew had said (The Economist, Survey of Asia, October 30, 1994, p. 23): 'I do not see them becoming a fractious, contentious society like America, always debating and knocking each other down. That is not their culture. They want growth and they want to get on with life. They are not interested in ideology as such, or in the theory of good government. They just know a good government and want a good government. Americans believe that out of contention, out of the clash of different ideas and ideals, you get good government. That view is not shared in Asia."

A Modest Proposal

Since we in South Asia in general, and Bangladesh in particular, are addicted to dynastic democracy, may I make a modest suggestion?

In Bangladesh (and the model may be worthy of emulation), we should try and bring the 21st century into our politics by cloning our dynastic leaders. They will then look exactly like the real thing, and the people will be no whit wiser.

At the same time, we should apply modern genetic technology to remove aggressive genes from the clones, and make our leaders less assertive and violent.

This way, the two dynasties would be able to coexist in harmony, and we’ll have a virtual national government, with each bowing out gracefully after every election. They can then dispense with their thugs, armed students and violently faithful teachers and bureaucrats.

And if any nasty atavistic, recessive gene turns up, well, we can simply clone the clones and remove that gene.

There will be only one problem, albeit a minor one: what to do with the real McKoys?